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ABSTRACT
This paper presents several alternative Social Security reform options in which the projected level
of benefits for every future cohort of retirees is as high or higher than the benefits projected in current law.
These future benefits can be achieved without any increase in the payroll tax or in other tax rates.  Under
each option, the Social Security Trust Fund is solvent and ends with a sustainable positive and growing
balance.
Each option combines the current pay-as-you-go system of defined benefits with an investment-
based personal retirement account (PRA). Assets in the PRA can be bequeathed if the individual dies
before normal retirement age. We also consider the option in which an individual can take all or part of
his accumulated PRA balanced as a lump sum at normal retirement age.
The basic plan that we present in greatest detail combines a transfer to the personal retirement
account of a portion of the individual’s payroll tax  equal to 1.5 percent of earnings if the individual
agrees to deposit an equal out-of-pocket amount.  The additional national saving that results from this
option leads to increased business investment and therefore to increased general tax revenue; a portion
of that revenue, equal to 1 percent of the PRA balances , is transferred to the Social Security Trust Fund.
The other options that we present include plans with no out-of-pocket contributions by
individuals and others with no transfer of general revenue to the Trust Fund.  We also discuss the
implications of different rates of return on the PRA balances and, more generally, the issue of risk,
including a market-based method of guaranteeing the real principal of all PRA deposits.
Martin Feldstein Andrew Samwick
Harvard University and NBER Dartmouth College and NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
mfeldstein@nber.org andrew.samwick@dartmouth.edu*Martin Feldstein is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.  Andrew Samwick is Professor of Economics at
Dartmouth College and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. We
are grateful for discussions with Charles Blahous, Jeff Brown, Steven Goss, David Podoff,
Robert Pozen, and Kent Smetters for discussions about these issues.
1See the 2001 Social Security Trustees Report which is available at
www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/index.html.
2This lower present value reflects the fact that the productivity of additional investment
exceeds the appropriate discount rate.  For an extensive discussion of this issue and some of the
related academic debate, see Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman, “Social Security,”
forthcoming in volume 4 of the Handbook of Public Economics and available now as NBER
Working Paper 8451 at www.nber.org/papers/w8451.  See in particular section 7.1.3 “The Gain
from Prefunding Social Security.”
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Potential Paths of Social Security Reform
       
Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick
*
It is now widely recognized that the Social Security benefits projected under current law
cannot continue to be financed by the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax.  The government’s Social
Security actuaries project that paying the benefits implied by current law would eventually
require raising the payroll tax to more than 18 percent.
1  There are only three possible responses
to this situation: reduce future retirement incomes, increase the taxes used to finance future
benefits, or save more now and invest those savings in a productive way. Increasing national
saving and earmarking those funds for the payment of future retirement benefits would lower the
present value of the cost of providing any level of benefits.
2  Avoiding future tax increases also
avoids the greater deadweight loss that would be caused by the distorting effects of higher 
marginal tax rates. 
Although we favor the increase in retirement saving, the choice among the three
possibilities is not a technical economic issue because it involves a value judgement about how
the costs and benefits should be divided among current and future population cohorts. As
economists we can show the possibilities and tradeoffs but the choice is inevitably one that must
be decided by the political process.3It is also unnecessary to change the projected retirement age or the way in which benefits
are indexed for inflation.
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Moreover, even if it is accepted that it would be preferable to raise saving for retirement
rather than cutting benefits or increasing future taxes, there are further normative decisions that
can only be resolved in the political process. Should current and future employees be required to
save more as a condition of maintaining their retirement incomes?  Should the “on budget”
surpluses that are projected after the next few years be committed to financing future retirement
benefits. That would cause the increased retirement saving to come at the expense of the public
or private consumption  that would otherwise be financed by spending those on-budget surpluses
or using them to finance personal tax cuts.  In this paper, we consider alternative combinations of
retirement saving policies so that those responsible for the policy decisions might have a better
understanding of the possible options.
Each of the alternative options for Social Security reform that we discuss combines the
existing pay-as-you-go system with a new system of personal retirement accounts invested in
stocks and bonds.  To keep our task manageable, we make four key assumptions:  
(1) Those who are now retired or will soon retire will receive the full pay-as-you-go
benefits specified in current law. 
(2)  The existing payroll tax rate and base will not be increased.  
(3) For each future cohort of retirees, the projected combination of the pay-as-you-go
benefits that can be financed with the existing payroll tax and the investment-
based personal annuities will equal or exceed  the benefits that are projected for
that cohort under current law.
3
(4)  There will be a permanent financing solution for Social Security that establishes 
solvency over the actuaries’ 75-year forecasting period.  By “75-year solvency,”
we mean that, in 2075, the Social Security Trust Fund is not only positive but
growing as a result of the reform.  This definition of solvency is to be contrasted
with the common description of eliminating the 75-year “actuarial deficit” used by
the Social Security actuaries.  The 2001 Social Security Trustees Report indicates
that an increase in revenues equal to 1.86 percent of taxable payroll in each year is4Taxable payroll refers to the earnings on which the OASDI payroll tax is levied.  It
includes the income of the self-employed that is subject to the Social Security tax. 
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sufficient to maintain a positive balance in the Trust Fund through the year 2075. 
However, such a payroll tax increase would eliminate the 75-year “actuarial
deficit” by temporarily building up the Trust Fund and then drawing it down. In
2075, the Trust Fund will be equal to only one year’s benefits and will be rapidly
shrinking.  After that, a large permanent financing gap of more than six percent of
taxable payroll
4 would remain for each future year.  This also implies that the 75-
year “actuarial deficit” would only be eliminated for the first year after the tax
increase;  after the first year, the system would again have a 75-year actuarial
deficit which would grow larger each year.  The 75-year actuarial deficit thus
vastly understates the size of the reform required to permanently restore solvency
to the Social Security system.
It is possible to satisfy all four goals in a mixed Social Security system because of the
higher expected rate of return that can be earned on the extra saving that is created in the
investment-based portion of the new system. The paper indicates how the old and new systems
work together to finance the costs of transition to the new mixed system.
Although our analysis deals with the average of all workers and beneficiaries in each birth
cohort and does not explicitly discuss distributional issues within cohorts, the results that we
present imply that the combined future benefits at every income level can be made equal to or
greater than those projected in current law.  More specifically, since the combined benefits from
the pay-as-you-go system and the investment-based accounts equal or exceed the benefits
projected in current law for the average of all individuals in each birth cohort, it is possible to
change the existing pay-as-you-go defined benefit formula in a way that achieves that same result
at each income level.5Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, “Two Percent Personal Retirement Accounts:
Their Potential Effects on Social Security Tax Rates and National Saving,” Tax Notes, May 4,
1998, pp 615-620, and Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, “Allocating Payroll Tax Revenue
to Personal Retirement Accounts to Maintain Social Security Benefits and the Payroll Tax Rate,:
Tax Notes, June 19, 2000, pp. 1645-1652. These articles are also available as NBER Working
Papers 6540 and 7767, available at www.nber.org/papers.
6 We do this so that our analysis will be directly comparable to the proposals developed
by the President’s Commission on Strengthening Social Security.
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In contrast to the detailed proposals in two of our previous papers
5,  the options described
here give individuals full ownership of their personal retirement accounts, with the right to
bequeath the entire accumulated funds if they die before retirement.  In addition, the amount of
the individual’s pay-as-you-go Social Security benefits is never reduced in response to the size of
that individual’s personal retirement account annuities.
More specifically, our calculations assume that personal retirement accounts can be
bequeathed to anyone the individual designates if he or she dies before the annuity begins at
“normal retirement age” (now 65 for anyone born before 1938 and increasing according to
current law to 67 for those born after 1959). In addition, the personal retirement account annuity
will continue to be paid for 10 years even if the annuitant dies during the first ten years after the
annuity begins, a common feature in private retirement plans known as a “ten year certain” life
annuity. These bequests and the continued annuity payments are in addition to the survivor
insurance benefits currently provided in the pay-as-you-go program (as modified like the other
pay-as-you-go benefits according to the rules that we describe below.)  The combination of these
personal retirement account bequests and the traditional pay-as-you-go survivor benefits can
make surviving spouses better off in the mixed system than they would be in the current pay-as-
you-go system even if the full pay-as-you-go benefits projected in current law were feasible. 
A further difference from our previous analyses is that we now separate out the disability
benefit component of Social Security and focus on the Old Age and Survivors Insurance.  We
assume that the Disability Insurance component will be financed by the pay-as-you-go tax.  We
therefore set aside the portion of the payroll tax that the Social Security actuaries estimate will be
needed to finance the disability benefits provided in current law.
6  According to the calculations7The Social Security actuaries forecast that the cost of the OASI benefits in 2075 under
current benefit rules would be 16.82 percent of payroll.  The income tax collected on OASI
benefits, under current law, would equal 0.89 percent of payroll, implying a net cost for the OASI
benefits of 15.93 percent of payroll.  The forecast for the cost of the DI benefits is 2.57 percent of
payroll.  With no change in the DI component of the payroll tax from the current 1.8 percent of
payroll, there is a shortfall of 0.77 percent of payroll.  Of this, 0.05 percent of payroll comes from
the income tax on DI benefits, implying a net cost of the DI benefits of 0.72 percent of payroll in
addition to the current 1.8 percent tax.  The funds needed for the combination of the OASI
program and the financing shortfall of the DI program are thus 16.65 percent of taxable payroll.  
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of the Social Security actuaries, with the disability payments treated separately, the payroll tax
that is needed in the future for OASI would have to rise from today’s actual 10.6 percent of
taxable payroll to 16.65 percent in 2075.
7 
In the plans that we analyze, a portion of each individual’s payroll tax is transferred to
that individual’s investment-based personal retirement account (PRA) instead of going into the
Social Security Trust Fund. In section 1,  individuals qualify for this transfer by contributing
some out-of-pocket funds of their own and accepting the explicit reduction in future pay-as-you-
go benefits that is needed to establish the solvency of the Social Security system. More
specifically, in the basic plan that we analyze in section 1,  individuals can transfer payroll taxes
of 1.5 percent of their earnings to their PRAs if they also voluntarily contribute an equal amount
of their own funds. Although experience with private sector defined contribution plans suggests
that a one-to-one matching rate would induce a very high participation rate, this might not be true
if individuals are also required to accept an explicit reduction in future pay-as-you-go benefits in
order to qualify for the matching transfer of payroll tax funds.  The feasibility of this basic plan
therefore depends on the ability of the political process to reduce pay-as-you-go benefits for all
future retirees, regardless of whether they choose to have a personal retirement plan or not.   If
the political process can legislate such a future reduction in pay-as-you-go benefits, individuals
are very likely to make the contribution necessary to obtain the matching funds, especially if the
government adds a guarantee that the combined benefits will not be less than the full benefits
projected in current law. But if the government is politically incapable of imposing a significant
mandatory reduction in future pay-as-you-go benefits, many individuals might choose to stay6 ssreform.11042001.wpd
with the current system in the hope that future Congresses would raise taxes on future workers to
maintain their current-law projected benefits.  
In section 2 we therefore consider alternative plans in which individuals do not have to
make out-of-pocket contributions. The personal retirement accounts are financed by a
combination of transfers from the payroll tax plus a matching of general revenue funds. In this
context, even individuals who believe that traditional benefits might not be reduced during their
retirement years would have a favorable incentive to accept the combination of lower pay-as-you-
go benefits and higher government-financed personal retirement account annuities.   This would
be particularly true if the government also provides a guarantee that the combined benefits would
be at least as large as the pay-as-you-go benefits projected under current law. 
As we discuss below, the creation of Personal Retirement Accounts increases total
national saving.  The higher saving finances additional business investment in new plant and
equipment. The greater capital stock implies more taxable income and therefore more tax
revenue. Our analysis in sections 1 and 2 assumes that the government transfers a portion of that
incremental tax revenue to the Social Security Trust Fund.  We recognize, however, that there is
uncertainty about the magnitude of the incremental tax revenue and therefore about the amount
of such funds that can appropriately be transferred from general revenue to the Trust Fund.  Our
general strategy in sections 1 and 2 is to be quite conservative in our estimate of the amount of
incremental revenue available to supplement the Trust Fund.  In section 3 we go further and
show what can be done if little or none of the additional revenue is used to supplement the Trust
Fund. 
The fourth section discusses the potential risk to future retirees that arises in the
investment-based part of the system and how a privately provided guarantee of the real value of
the PRA deposits can reduce that risk. Section 5 discusses the possibility of lump-sum payments
from the PRA accounts at age 67 instead of annuitization. There is a brief concluding section.
The accounting model used in this paper follows the same procedure that we used
previously by basing our calculations on the detailed economic and demographic projections of
the Social Security actuaries.  The model is also calibrated so that, with the current Social
Security law, it closely approximates the time series of benefits, revenue and Trust Fund assets8The 2001 Social Security Trustees Report and the accompanying 75-year forecasts on
which our simulations are based are available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/index.html.
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predicted in the 2001 Social Security Trustees Report.
8 The unit of analysis for the simulations of
the pay-as-you-go system is the individual. Benefits for spouses, dependents and survivors are
subsumed in the individual benefit provision which is then scaled so that the OASI benefits
correspond to those projected by the Social Security actuaries.  We use the Census Bureau’s
projections of future age structures of the U.S. population. These projections incorporate
projections of future birth, death and immigration rates. We scale up the projected population of
every age to coincide with the aggregate population projections of the Social Security
Administration for each future year. 
The simulations assume that individuals begin work at 21 and continue to work until the
year before they reach the normal retirement age legislated for their birth cohort (or die if that
occurs sooner.)  Since not everyone in the population of working age actually works in each year,
we adjust the labor force participation rate to obtain the number of covered workers in each
future year that is projected by the Social Security actuaries.
Our calculations embody the historic data for Social Security taxable payroll for the years
before 2001 and then use the forecast of taxable payroll in the intermediate assumptions of the
2001 Social Security Trustees Report for subsequent years.  According to that forecast, the
average real wage rises at 1.0 percent per year in the long term.  Our calculations assume that
movements of the average real wage reflect changes in the age structure of the labor force,
differences among age groups in the relative level of wages, and the overall rate of increase of
age-specific wage rates. 
1. A Basic Mixed System with Equal PRA Contributions
Our analysis assumes that the Personal Retirement Account (PRA) system begins with
the year 2003 and that, in the basic plan analyzed in this section,  all employees in that year shift
1.5 percent of their 12.4 percent payroll tax to the new Personal Retirement Accounts and make9See Fred Goldberg and Michael Graetz, “Reforming Social Security: A Practical and
Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts,” in J. Shoven (ed.) Administrative Aspects
of Investment Based Social Security Reform (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000) for a
description of a low cost way of shifting a portion of payroll tax funds to individually-chosen
mutual fund managers, insurance companies or banks. The Goldberg-Graetz paper is also 
available as NBER Working Paper W6970 (www.nber.org/papers/W6970).
10See section 4 below for the implications of alternative real rates of return:  a 3.5 percent
real rate of return (the real rate that is currently available on U.S. Treasury Inflation Protected
Securities), as well as real rates of 5.0 percent, 6.5 percent and 7.5 percent.   
11For technical analytic reasons, it is common among academic finance specialists to
describe rates of return on portfolios that contain equities in logarithmic terms even though it is
the “level” rate of return that matters for investors.  The mean logarithmic rate of return of the
60:40 stock-bond portfolio described above was 5.9 percent over the same 50 year period but,
with the associated volatility, this implies a mean level return of 6.9 percent. 
12This 40 basis point charge may be more than the amount that would be needed in
practice.  TIAA-CREF now offers a variable annuity of the type described here based on the
Russell 3000 stock index with an annual expense ratio of 0.37 percentage points even though
TIAA-CREF has to manage collection of account deposits at varying intervals, permits fund
transfers whenever the individual wants,  and is required to provide a detailed quarterly report to
each individual. 
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an equal out-of-pocket contribution.
9  Of the remaining 10.9 percent, 1.8 percent is separated as it
is today for the pay-as-you-go disability program.  The remaining 9.1 percent of taxable payroll is
available to pay OASI benefits in 2003 with the excess added to the OASI trust fund balance.
The investments in the Personal Retirement Accounts and the post-retirement variable
annuities are assumed to earn a real rate of return of 5.5 percent after inflation.
10 A portfolio
invested 60 percent in the Standard and Poors 500 portfolio of common stock and 40 percent in a
portfolio of corporate bonds during the fifty year period through 1995 had a mean return of 6.9
percent.
11  We deduct 0.4 percent for administrative costs
12 and an additional 1.0 percent as a
conservative “margin of safety” of the mean return. We follow the Social Security Trustees in
assuming that the real return on government bonds in the Social Security Trust Fund will decline
gradually to a 3.0 percent real interest rate in the future. 13For a description of how such a variable annuity works, see Martin Feldstein and Elena
Ranguelova, “Individual Risk in an Investment-Based Social Security System”, American
Economic Review, September 2001 (forthcoming).  This is also NBER Working Paper 8074
(available at www.nber.org/papers/W8074).
14In practice, the program might require a minimum of, say, five years of deposits to avoid
very small annual payments.  Individuals who retire with less than five years of deposits might
receive a lump sum distribution or be allowed to leave the funds to accumulate for a lump sum
distribution at a future date.  Our analysis assumes that individuals above normal retirement age
are not participating in the PRA system but that obviously could be allowed in actual practice. 
15The PRA annuities, like the pay-as-you-go benefits, are subject to personal income tax
if the total income of the taxpayer exceeds a threshold limit.  We show both the PRA annuities
and the pay-as-you-go benefits net of this income tax in all of our tables and calculations.
16Permitting pre-retirement bequests and the ten-year certain life annuity reduces the
personal retirement account funds available to pay the annuity to the retired employee.  Martin
Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova calculated that the pre-retirement bequests reduce the funds
available for the annuity by 14 percent and that the ten year certain feature of the life annuity
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1.1  Aggregate PRA deposits, PRA annuities and PRA balances.
The combined PRA deposits of 3 percent of taxable payroll are projected to be $131
billion (at the year 2001 price level) in 2003. The deposited amounts increase over time as
earnings rise, reaching $170 billion  in 2020, $220 billion in 2040, and $334 billion in 2075, the
final year of our analysis. These figures are shown in column 1 of Table 1. 
We assume that individuals begin to receive payments from their PRAs at their normal
retirement ages as specified in current law (i.e., 65 for anyone born before 1938 and increasing
according to current law to 67 for those born after 1959) in the form of a variable annuity that
earns the same 5.5 percent real rate of return that we assume for the accumulation
phase.
13 The first annuities are paid to individuals who become 65 in the year 2004  and total
only $100 million.
14 
15 Total annuities grow rapidly, reaching $3.4 billion in 2010, $121 billion in
2030 and $1129 billion in 2075 (all in year 2001 dollars).  These figures and amounts for
selected intermediate years are shown in column 2 of Table 1.  The rapid rise in the annuity
amounts reflect the increasing number of annuitants and the growth in the average annuity
amount.  The increase in the average annuity amount reflects the increased number of years of
PRA contributions among successive cohorts of retirees as well as rising real earnings.
16reduces the funds by an additional 5.5 percent. We recognize these costs in the calculations
throughout the paper by reducing the funds that are available to finance the retiree’s PRA annuity
to 81 percent of what they would otherwise be [(0.945)(0.86) = 0.81]. This implies that the PRA
benefits that could be financed with a 2 percent PRA contribution in the absence of the bequest
provisions would, all other things equal, require a 2.5 percent PRA contribution with pre-
retirement bequests and ten year certain annuities. For the Feldstein and Ranguelova calculations,
see their paper “The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security,” in M. Feldstein,
ed., Distributional Aspects of Social Security Reform (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
forthcoming) which is also NBER Working Paper 7065, April 1999, available at
www.nber.org/papers/W7065.
17Since one percent of taxable payroll corresponds to between 0.40 percent of gross
domestic product in 2001 and 0.35 percent of gross domestic product in 2075, the annuity
payments rise from about 0.04 percent of GDP in 2010 to about 3.5 percent of GDP in 2075.
18The total OASDI tax rate remains unchanged at 12.4 percent. Of this 1.8 percent is
earmarked for the DI program and 1.5 percent is transferred to the personal retirement accounts.
The net shortfall in the financing of the DI program reduces the funds available for the OASI
benefits by an additional 0.72 percent, as explained in footnote 4, while the income tax on OASI
benefits that is transferred to the Trust Fund under current law adds 0.89 percent of payroll. 
Combining these four components implies net funds for OASI of 9.27 percent of payroll. 
19See footnote 7.  The cost rate for the OASI benefits is 16.82 percent, of which 0.89
percent is financed by the income tax on OASI benefits for a net cost of 15.93 percent of payroll.  
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The same payments are shown in column 3 of Table 1 as percentages of the taxable
payroll  of all individuals in each of the selected years.  The amounts rise from less than 0.1
percent of taxable payroll in 2010 to 1.9 percent in 2030, 5.9 percent in 2050, and 10.2 percent in
2075.
17  Note that this 10.2 percent of taxable payroll would be more than sufficient to fill the
gap between the net OASI tax of 9.27 percent
18 of payroll and the tax rate of 15.93 percent of
payroll that the Social Security actuaries forecast as the cost of OASI program in 2075 under
current law.
19
The aggregate value of the funds in all Personal Retirement Accounts grows with the
PRA deposits of 3 percent of each year’s taxable payroll and with the 5.5 percent rate of return
on the existing PRA assets and is diminished by the annuity payouts and lump-sum bequests. 
The resulting aggregate PRA value is shown in column 4 of Table 1 in billions of year 2001
dollars and in column 5 as a percentage of the corresponding aggregate taxable payroll.  The20The tendency for Congress and the administration to spend unified budget surpluses is
consistent with the budget history of the past half century in which unified surpluses have
virtually never been allowed to occur. Even the off-budget surpluses in the Social Security Trust
Fund that accumulated as a result of the 1983 Social Security reforms were more than matched
by on-budget deficits, producing overall budget deficits in spite of the off-budget Social Security
surpluses. 
21If households expect that the mixed system of pay-as-you-go benefits and PRA
annuities will essentially just maintain the level of benefits projected in current law, they have no
reason to reduce saving or to increase spending from other assets.  For many individuals who do
little or no saving now, the provision of Personal Retirement Accounts may create a vehicle for
new saving and an “education” about the nature of financial investment that induces more such
saving.  It would be relatively simple for the financial institutions that provide Personal
Retirement Accounts to offer the opportunity for a parallel personal investment account, a feature
that we do not try to incorporate into our analysis. 
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PRA assets rise rapidly, from $1,336 billion in 2010 to $8,026 billion in 2030 and $32,466
billion in 2075. As a percentage of taxable payroll, these assets rise from 27 percent in 2010 to
125 percent in 2030 and 292 percent in 2075. 
The PRA system adds to national saving and therefore increases national investment in
business plant and equipment.  This increase in saving and investment occurs through two
different channels. First, the individuals contribute 1.5 percent of earnings directly to their PRA
accounts. The interest and dividends earned in these accounts is a further source of national
saving. And the retained earnings portion of the extra profits that result from the increased
investment in business plant and equipment also add to private saving and to greater business
investment. 
The second way in which the PRA system adds to national saving is through its effect on
future government spending and future tax reductions.  The future transfer of funds from the
government budget to the PRA accounts reduces the size of the government’s unified budget
surplus and thereby reduces the likelihood that future Congresses and administrations would use
those funds to finance additional government spending or additional tax cuts that finance private
spending.
20  The funds that are shifted to Personal Retirement Accounts are additions to personal
saving and therefore to national saving.
21   The net effect of reduced future government spending22A more general analysis would recognize that over time the increase in the nation’s
capital stock would reduce the rate of return to capital and increase wages.  The extra corporate
tax would therefore be less than the amount described in the following text but there would also
be increased personal income tax revenue on the higher wage and salary incomes. Since the
offsetting effects are of similar size, an estimate based on the corporate tax calculation with an
unchanged rate of return is an adequate approximation for the current purpose. 
23See James Poterba, “The Rate of Return to Corporate Capital and Factor Shares: New
Estimates Using Revised National Income Accounts and Capital Stock Data,” Carnegie
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 48, pp 211-46.
24The 5.5 percent rate of return that we assume reaches PRA investment accounts is after
the corporate tax payments to the federal and state governments as well as after the investment
management fees.
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and smaller future tax cuts, combined with a shift of funds from the government accounts to
Personal Retirement Accounts, implies that PRA deposits increase national saving.  
It is of course difficult to know just how much all of this would add to national saving. 
The answer depends on the reaction of future Congresses to smaller unified surpluses and on the
way that households adjust other behavior in response to their PRA deposits. The extent of the
increase in national saving is relevant to the finances of Social Security because the rise in
business plant and equipment that results from the additional saving means greater national
income  and therefore greater tax revenue that can be used to augment the Trust Fund without
raising tax rates or decreasing other government spending.  Because of the uncertain magnitude
of the increased saving, we use conservative assumptions about the additional tax revenue and, in
Section 3, show the implications of ignoring the extra tax revenue completely.
The simplest way to estimate the increased tax revenue that results from the increased
national saving is to consider the likely effect on corporate profits and therefore on corporate tax
revenue.
22  Incremental investments in the  corporate sector have earned a real return of about 8.5
percent
23 and have been subject to an average federal corporate income tax rate of about 29
percent, implying that the government receives 2.5 percent of the incremental corporate capital.
24 
Of course, not all of the increased national saving flows into corporate investments since some of
the additional saving goes into owner-occupied housing and other noncorporate investment and
some flows abroad. To recognize the fact that some of the incremental national saving goes into25Our analysis of the solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund does not depend on our
estimates of national saving but only on the willingness of future Congresses and
Administrations to transfer general revenue to the Trust Fund equal to 1 percent of the PRA
balances. We show in section 2 that the Trust Fund can remain solvent and the combined benefits
be equal or greater than the benefits projected in current law with an infusion of general revenue
that is much smaller than one percent of the PRA balances. 
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noncorporate investments, we scale down the return that the federal government gets on
incremental saving by one fifth, from 2.5 percent to 2.0 percent of the incremental saving. 
In our earlier papers, we assumed that the entire PRA balance represented a net increase
in the nation’s capital stock and therefore applied the 2 percent revenue rate to the entire PRA
balance to estimate the amount of incremental revenue that the government receives as a result of
creating the PRA system. In the current section, we limit the estimated incremental revenue to
just 1 percent of the PRA balance.  
A possible rationale for estimating that the incremental revenue is just 1 percent of PRA
balances would be that each dollar of out-of-pocket individual PRA deposits raises national
saving rate by a dollar, implying incremental revenue of 2 percent of that part of the PRA
balance, while the transfer of payroll tax revenue to the PRA account does not add anything at all
to national saving.  Applying the 2 percent rate on the half of PRA accumulation that results from
the voluntary personal saving implies a 1 percent overall rate on the full PRA account.  We think
this is extreme and unrealistic.  We believe that the transfer of payroll tax revenue does add to
national saving (for the reasons described earlier in this section) and that each dollar of out-of-
pocket PRA deposits represents less than a dollar of additional saving.  We regard the
assumption that incremental federal tax revenue is 1 percent of the PRA balances as a
conservative estimate of the combined effect of both types of saving. 
As we show in the section 1.2, with the Trust Fund augmented by this incremental
revenue and with the PRA annuities permitting smaller pay-as-you-go benefits without reducing
the total combined benefits of individuals, the Trust Fund remains permanently positive.
25 
Indeed, a significant amount of the incremental corporate tax revenue is not needed in the longer
run and some of those funds could therefore be used to reduce other taxes or to finance other
government spending.26The familiar statements that benefits will exceed taxes in 2016 and that the Trust Fund
would be exhausted by 2038 correspond to the entire OASDI system, including disability
insurance.
14 ssreform.11042001.wpd
1.2 The Trust Fund and the Growth of Pay-as-You-Go Benefits
Under current law, the sum of the OASI portion of the payroll tax and other OASI Trust
Fund receipts (i.e., the interest on the Trust Fund balance and the general revenue transferred to
the Trust Fund on the basis of taxing the benefits of high income retirees) is projected to exceed
the OASI benefits only through 2021.  After that, benefits can continue to be paid temporarily by
borrowing from the public through the sale of the government bonds that are held in the Social
Security Trust Fund. When the Trust Fund bonds are exhausted in 2040, Social Security pay-as-
you-go benefits will have to be cut or taxes will have to be raised.
26  
The advantage of the basic mixed system is that the Trust Fund remains positive at all
times in the future without any increase in taxes while the projected combination of the PRA
annuities and the pay-as-you-go benefits for each cohort of retirees exceeds the pay-as-you-go
benefits that are projected in current law (but that could not be financed without a tax increase in
the current pure pay-as-you-go system.)  To do this, the pay-as-you-go portion of total retirement
benefits must be reduced from the levels projected in current law to levels that can be financed
but that are nevertheless high enough so that the total combined benefits exceed the pay-as-you-
go benefits projected in current law. We will refer to those current law projected benefits as the
“benchmark benefits.” 
There are a variety of ways that the pay-as-you-go benefits can be reduced relative to the
levels projected in current law.  In this section, we use a very simple method that reduces pay-as-
you-go benefits by 0.3 percent for each year that the individual participates in the PRA system
during the first five years of the program (2003 through 2007), followed by reductions of 0.6
percent per year for the next six years (2008 through 2013), 0.9 percent per year during the
subsequent  five year period (2014 through 2018), 1.2 percent per year for 2019 through 2025,
and finally by 1.5 percent per year up to a cumulative maximum reduction of 40 percent of the
benchmark benefits. For example, an individual who is 50 years old in 2003 and retires at 66 in27Employees who join the labor force and start making contributions to PRA accounts
after 2025 have their pay-as-you-go benefits reduced by 1.5 percent for each year that they work
up to a maximum of 40 percent.
28The decline in the balance occurs five years after benefits exceed payroll tax receipts
because the Trust Fund also receives interest on its accumulated balances.
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2019 would receive pay-as-you-go benefits that are 9.6 percent less than the benefits specified in
current law.
27  As we show in section 1.3 below, the combination of these pay-as-you-go benefits
and the variable annuity available at age 66 would slightly exceed the “benchmark” benefits
projected in current law for his cohort.  A 21 year old in 2003 would reach retirement age in
2049; his combined benefits would exceed the pay-as-you-go benefits in current law by 20
percent (and would exceed the pay-as-you-go benefits that could then be financed by a 12.4
percent payroll tax by substantially more.) 
Before looking at what the combined benefits would mean to each age cohort in each
future year, we consider the impact of the mixed system on the path of the Trust Fund.  The
balance in the Trust Fund is increased each year by the sum of four things: (1) the payroll taxes
collected (i.e., the 10.6 percent payroll tax for OASI less any required transfer to cover the DI
shortfall), (2) the interest earned on the existing trust fund balance, (3) the personal income tax
revenue collected under current law on the pay-as-you-go benefits paid to retirees with incomes
above certain thresholds and (4) the transfer of some or all of the incremental tax revenue that
results from increased national saving and investment.  At the same time, the Trust Fund is
reduced by the sum of OASI benefits paid and by the 1.5 percent of taxable payroll transferred to
the PRA accounts.  The PRA system thus affects the annual change in the balance of the trust
fund by (1) reducing the inflow of taxes by 1.5 percent of taxable payroll, (2) by reducing the
outflow of OASI benefits according to the rule described in the previous paragraph, and (3) by
adding some or all of the incremental tax revenue that results from the increased national saving. 
With the current pure pay-as-you-go system, the Trust Fund balance for the OASI
program starts to decline in 2021
28 and becomes negative in 2038; these figures are shown for
selected years in dollars of 2001 in column 1 of Table 2 and as a percentage of taxable payroll in
column 2. We assume that the Social Security Trust Fund borrows to finance its deficit after29Recall that our analysis is for an average beneficiary.  This includes a mixture of income
levels and marital status such that multiplying benefits of the “average  beneficiary” by the
projected number of  beneficiaries gives the projected aggregate amount of benefits.
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2038 at the same government bond rate (3 percent real, according to the Social Security
actuaries) at which the Trust Fund can invest surpluses.  The Trust Fund balance becomes
increasingly negative if taxes are not raised or benefits reduced.
This exploding level of Trust Fund debt can be contrasted with the projected Trust Fund
balances under the basic mixed-system plan that are shown in column 3 (in dollars of 2001) and
in column 4 as a percentage of the taxable payroll.  The balance in the trust fund is positive in
every year.  It declines to a low of just $8.9 billion in 2043, and then begins to increase rapidly,
reaching $355 billion in 2050, $1.9 trillion in 2060, and $6.2 trillion in 2075. By 2065, the trust
fund balance exceeds 30 percent of taxable payroll.  After that date, it is possible to maintain the
Trust Fund at 30 percent of taxable payroll while shifting even less than 1 percent of the PRA
balances into the Trust Fund.  This would permit significant incremental tax revenue with which
to reduce other taxes or to finance other government outlays.
1.3 Comparing the Mixed System Benefits in the Basic “Three Percent Plan”  and the 
Benefits in Current Law
The features of the basic plan – i.e., the gradual reduction in pay-as-you-go benefits and
the provision of PRA annuities that are based on deposits of a combined three percent of taxable
payroll contribution and a 5.5 percent real return on the PRA accounts and PRA annuities –
imply that each cohort of retirees would receive more in each year from the combination of the
two types of benefits than they would receive under existing pay-as-you-go benefit rules.
Consider for example a typical 30 year old employee in 2003 who would reach normal
retirement age win 2040.
29 Under current law, his “benchmark level of benefits” (i.e., the full
level of benefits projected in current law) would be $15,300 (in 2001 dollars.)  However, since
the Trust Fund is exhausted by that date and the available payroll tax can finance only a fraction
of all benefits specified in current law, benefits must be reduced to the available funds if taxes
are not to be increased.  Reducing benefits by the same proportion for all retirees in each year in30This is the 10.6 percent payroll tax plus the income tax on OASI benefits and minus the
funds needed to fill the gap in the DI financing (see footnote 4 for a description for 2075).
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order to make the aggregate OASI benefit equal to the available revenue
30 would reduce the
initial benefit for the individual who was 30 years old in 2003 by 31.1 percent to $10,550. That
individual would see his real benefits reduced further in subsequent years; for example, when he
is 87 the projected benefits would be reduced from 68.9 percent of the current benchmark for his
cohort to 65.6 percent, i.e., from $10,550 dollars to $10,037.
In contrast, the mixed system analyzed here would combine pay-as-you-go benefits equal
to 61 percent of the benchmark level (the result of the formula described above for making
annual reductions in the pay-as-you-go benefit) and a PRA annuity equal to $6,520  or 42.6 
percent of his benchmark benefit. The 30 year old can therefore expect a combined benefit that is
103.6 percent of his benchmark benefit in current law and 150.2 percent of the benefit that could
be paid in the pure pay-as-you-go system without an increase in the payroll tax rate. In addition,
the individual can bequeath his accumulated PRA balance if he dies before age 67 and will
provide a ten-year certain annuity to his heirs of $6,520  a year until age 77 if he dies before that
age.  
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the “benchmark” level of annual benefits in 2001 dollars for
retirees who will reach normal retirement age in selected years starting in 2005. Under current
law, these benefits remain unchanged in real terms throughout the individual’s  retirement.   Note
that the real “benchmark” benefit increases by 36 percent between 2005 and 2030 and by 107
percent between 2005 and 2075. 
Column 2 shows the effect of reducing all benefits after the Trust Fund is empty to the
amount that could be paid without raising the payroll tax.  The benefits shown are for the first
retirement year of each cohort and then decline in each subsequent year.  
Column 3 shows the reduced pay-as-you-go benefits that result from the benefit
adjustment rule described above, again stated in real 2001 dollars. Note that the reduced pay as
you go benefits in each future year remain almost as high as the real benefits are in 2005. After
2053, the reduced pay-as-you-go benefits are actually higher in every year than they are in 2005.31It would of course be possible for the Social Security program to pay higher pay-as-you-
go benefits in the earlier years, allowing the Trust Fund to be temporarily in deficit, and then to
repay that debt and make the Trust Fund positive before the end of the 75 year forecast period.
We do not examine this idea further. 
32It might also be thought of as compensation for taking the increased risk of greater
reliance on the investment-based portion.
33That was a feature of the plan that we analyzed in Martin Feldstein and Andrew
Samwick, “Two Percent Personal Retirement Accounts: Their Potential Effects on Social
Security Tax Rates and National Saving,” Tax Notes, May 4, 1998, pp 615-620
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Column 4 shows the PRA annuity for the cohort reaching normal retirement age in each
year.  Columns 5 and 6 restate the pay-as-you-go benefits as a percentage of the benchmark level. 
Column 7 shows the combined benefit as a percentage of the benchmark benefit. The combined
benefit is never lower than the benchmark in current law.  Cohorts that are young today or that
are yet to join the labor force would benefit greatly from the fully phased in PRA system, with
combined benefits rising from 10 percent more than the benchmark level to 35 percent more than
the benchmark level.
31  
The growing excess of the combined benefits relative to the benchmark can be thought of
as a “cushion” against the increasing  risk that occurs through time with the  increased reliance
on the PRA portion of the total, a subject to which we return in section 4.
32  Before doing so, we
discuss the provision of government guarantees and then consider several alternatives to the basic
plan that we have described in this section. 
1.4 Government Guaranteed Benefits
The basic plan would of course be more attractive to individuals if the government
guaranteed that each individual’s combined benefit would be at least as large as the benchmark
level projected in current law.
33  With such a guarantee, the individual could receive more
income than his benchmark benefit if the investment performs better than expected but could not
receive less if the investment performs worse than expected. 
A guarantee would in effect make future taxpayers responsible for the difference between
the benchmark benefit and the actual combined value of the pay-as-you-go benefit plus the34Basing the guarantee on a standard portfolio would also not induce individuals to take
on excessive risk in their portfolios.  See Andrew Samwick, “Social Security Reform in the
United States,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 52 (December 1999), 819-842, for a further
discussion of this point.
35See Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, “Individual Risk and Intergenerational
Risk Sharing in an Investment Based Social Security System,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 6839, 1998, available at www.nber.org/papers/W6839.  See also Martin
Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, “Individual Risk in an Investment Based Social Security
System,” American Economic Review, Vol. 91, September 2001, pp 1116-1125, available as
National Bureau Working Paper 8074 at www.nber.org/papers/W8074.
36The paper by Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova and Andrew Samwick, “The
Transition to Investment-Based Social Security When Portfolio Returns and Capital Profitability
are Uncertain” appears in John Campbell and Martin Feldstein, eds. Risk Aspects of Investment-
Based Social Security Reform (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001) and is available at
www.nber.org/papers/w7016.
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annuity that would be paid on a “standard  investment portfolio.”   An individual who invests in
such a standard portfolio – e.g., 60 percent of the PRA balance invested in a broad index of
stocks like the S & P 500 and 40 percent in a corporate bond index – would receive from the
government the difference (if any) between the combined benefit that results from this
investment plus the reduced pay-as-you-go benefits and the benchmark level of benefits in
current law for that future year. 
Even if an individual chooses to invest in a portfolio that is different from the “standard
one,” the government could compensate the individual on the basis of the shortfall that would
have occurred if the individual had invested  in the standard portfolio.  Individuals would thus
have the opportunity to be guaranteed to receive the full benchmark level of benefits by investing
in the standard portfolio but would not lose the value of that guarantee if they chose a different
portfolio.
34       
Calculations by Feldstein and Ranguelova
35 and Feldstein, Ranguelova and Samwick
36
show that the expected cost to future taxpayers of providing such a guarantee would be relatively
small.  In most years, even after the system is fully phased-in, the great majority of individuals in
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and there would be no need for guarantee payments. The government could spread the cost of
any payments that were required over time by borrowing when payments are due and repaying in
later years or establishing a fund for financing future shortfalls when they occur.
The guarantee might also be made optional with individuals paying a small surcharge on
the payroll tax to purchase the guarantee from the government, eliminating any net tax on future
employees.  In an optional plan, the form of the guarantee could be tailored to individual
preferences. The cost could be reduced by providing less than a 100 percent guarantee.
The appendix to this paper presents a calculation that shows that even when the mixed 
system is fully phased in and the pay-as-you-go system provides only 60 percent of the
benchmark level of benefits, the expected cost to taxpayers of a full benefit guarantee would be
about 0.6 percent of payroll. Since the pay-as-you-go benefits would be substantially greater than
60 percent of the benchmark level for retirees during the next several decades, the cost of the
guarantee during those decades would be significantly less than 0.6 percent of payroll. 
We return in section 4 of this paper to a more general discussion of risk and guarantees.
For now, we turn instead to alternatives to the basic plan that do not require individuals to make
out-of-pocket contributions to their personal retirement accounts.
2. Alternative Plans with No Out-of-Pocket Contributions
The basic plan described in section 1 should appeal to any individual who believes that
his pay-as-you-go benefit will inevitably be reduced along the kind of path described in that
section.  For someone like that,  participating in the basic plan means receiving a dollar-for-dollar
match for the out-of-pocket funds contributed to his personal retirement account without having
to accept any additional reduction in future benefits.
But what if an individual believes that the benchmark level of benefits projected in
current law will not be decreased during his lifetime because future Congresses will vote to raise
taxes or to borrow?  Since the Trust Fund accounting now implies that there are funds available
to pay projected benefits through 2038, someone who is 50 years old or older might feel that
there is limited risk of any benefit reduction during his life.  And since Congress raised taxes in
1983 when the Trust Fund was about to be exhausted in order to allow benefits to remain almost21 ssreform.11042001.wpd
unchanged, individuals might well believe that would happen in the future when the Trust Fund
was again on the brink of exhaustion.  
Such an individual might be willing to pay 1.5 percent of his earnings  into a personal
retirement account in order to receive an equal  matching transfer from his payroll tax payments
but might not voluntarily accept a reduction in future pay-as-you-go benefits as part of such a
package.  Without such a reduction in future pay-as-you-go  benefits, there would be no
improvement in the fiscal condition of Social Security and therefore no reduction in the need for
future increases in Social Security taxes.  
There are of course features of the basic plan that might make it attractive enough to
cause individuals to accept it.  The funds accumulated in the PRAs would not be subject to future
legislative changes and would be available for bequests and possibly for a lump sum withdrawal
at retirement age. The combined benefit would be projected to be as large as under current law
and there would be the opportunity for greater retirement income if the investments outperform
the assumed 5.5 percent real rate of return.  With a government guarantee that the combined
benefits would at least equal the benefits in current law, the individual would have an upside
potential but no downside risk.  Nevertheless, it might be only those who regarded the future
benefits as either uncertain or sure to be reduced who would voluntarily shift to the basic plan
that requires them to contribute 1.5 percent of payroll out of pocket.
The obvious implication is that if the political process is to achieve voluntary acceptance
of an option like the basic plan of section 1, it must be made clear in legislation that future
benefits will be reduced for all individuals, regardless of whether or not they participate in the
plan.  If that is done, the attractiveness of the dollar-for-dollar match and the guarantee would
induce virtually everyone to participate.  
It is not clear, however, that the political process can convincingly deliver the bad news
that future pay-as-you-go benefits must be cut for everyone even if that news is combined with a
plan that allows people to achieve the original  level of benefits by contributing only 1.5 percent
of earnings to a personal retirement account.  In this section we therefore consider alternative
options that achieve the four goals of social security reform without any out-of-pocket payments
by current or future employees. Those four goals are: (1) provide the pay-as-you-go benefits37This program is thus a combination of the mixed systems that we explored in two or our
earlier papers. Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, “Two Percent Personal Retirement
Accounts: Their Potential Effects on Social Security Tax Rates and National Saving,” Tax Notes,
May 4, 1998, pp 615-620, dealt with a system in which all PRA deposits came from on-budget
surpluses while  Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, “Allocating Payroll Tax Revenue to
Personal Retirement Accounts to Maintain Social Security Benefits and the Payroll Tax Rate,:
Tax Notes, June 19, 2000, pp. 1645-1652, dealt with a system in which all PRA deposits came
from the payroll taxes.  
38An economic downturn in 2001 and 2002 would temporarily reduce government
revenue and budget surpluses but should not have any significant effect on the long-run
surpluses. It is of course difficult to know how much of the projected surpluses might be spent on
anti-terrorist activities in both the short-run and more distant future.
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promised to existing retirees; (2) maintain the projected level of combined benefits for each
future cohort of retirees at or above the level of benefits indicated in current law; (3) avoid any
increase in  payroll tax rates; and (4) make the Social Security Trust Fund solvent in the sense
that it either remains permanently positive (so that the pay-as-you-go benefits can always be
financed from the available payroll tax revenue) or borrows for a while but then returns to a
growing positive balance that makes it clear that no future increase in the payroll tax will be
needed.
The key to achieving these four goals without the out-of-pocket contributions of the basic
plan of section 1 is to inject some general revenue into the personal retirement accounts.
37 The
official projections of the Congressional Budget Office indicate that there are substantial future
on-budget surpluses (i.e., budget surpluses excluding those of the Social Security program) that
could be used for this purpose after the first few years of a new Personal Retirement Account
system.    The Congressional Budget Office’s Budget and Economic Outlook  issued in August
2001 projects on-budget surpluses of $108 billion in 2008, rising to $184 billion in 2010.
Although the CBO does not provide estimates beyond 2011, these on-budget surpluses would
continue to grow for a number of years in the future even if the tax law provisions that are now
scheduled to end in 2011 are continued into the future.
38  
We present two options of this general type.  The first option combines a transfer of two
percent of payroll taxes to personal retirement accounts with an additional one percent matching39Such surpluses are not present during the first few years of the assumed phase in
schedule but would be available by 2008. 
40In section 3 we consider an option in which there is no transfer of the incremental
revenue to the Trust Fund. 
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contribution by the government, financed from general on-budget surpluses.
39  The second option
enriches the program in the early years by adding an additional $50 billion a year to the PRAs
from the on-budget surpluses from 2008 through 2017. 
These transfers of on-budget surpluses would reduce the ability of future Congresses and
administrations to increase spending or cut personal taxes, i.e., the ability to finance increased
public or private consumption.  This would be in addition to the reduction of  the unified
surpluses caused by the transfer of payroll tax revenue to the personal retirement accounts.  The
transfer of budget funds to the personal retirement accounts would thus increase national saving
and the nation’s stock of capital.  Although we recognize that every dollar added to the personal
retirement accounts does not constitute new national saving, we continue to assume (as we did in
section 1) that the increase in nation’s capital stock that does occur leads to additional national
income and therefore additional tax revenue equal to at least one percent of the assets in the
personal retirement accounts. We transfer this additional revenue to the Trust Fund.
40  
The transfer of two percentage points of payroll taxes into the PRAs depletes the trust
fund balances more rapidly than the 1.5 percent assumed in the basic plan of section 1. To
balance that faster depletion,  we adopt a more rapid and larger cumulative adjustment of future
pay-as-you-go benefits to 50 percent of the benchmark level of benefits.  The benefit adjustment
is slow enough, however, that the projected value of the combined benefits remains greater than
the benchmark benefits for each cohort of retirees.
The results of this plan are summarized in Table 4.  Column 1 shows the level of pay-as-
you-go benefits relative to benchmark benefits for selected birth cohorts, listed by the year in
which members of that cohort reach normal retirement age.  The reduction is quite slow, with
those who reach age 67 in 2020 receiving pay-as-you-go benefits equal to 89.5 percent of the
benchmark level.  Even those who are now just 38 years old and who will reach age 67 in 203024 ssreform.11042001.wpd
would receive pay-as-you-go benefits of 75.5 percent of the benchmark.  Only in 2047 does the
ratio of pay-as-you-go benefits relative to the benchmark reach the long-run value of 50 percent.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the projected value of the combined benefits exceeds the
benchmark level by a slight amount for those cohorts who will retire between now and 2040 and
then rises significantly when the pay-as-you-go share is no longer being reduced to a projected
gain of 18.3 percent in 2060 and 24.8 percent in 2075.  These results are very similar to the
combined benefits of the basic plan shown in column 7 of Table 3.
The combination of the reduction in pay-as-you-go benefits and the transfer of the new
incremental tax revenue equal to one percent of the aggregate PRA balances to the Trust Fund is
sufficient to keep the Trust Fund solvent. More specifically, the Trust Fund becomes negative in
2030 but starts to repay the borrowing in 2048 and returns to a positive balance after 18 years in
2066.  By 2070 the Trust Fund is equal to 13 percent of payroll and rising faster than total
payroll, reaching 28.4 percent of payroll in 2075.
The second plan uses some of the projected on-budget surpluses to augment the Personal
Retirement Accounts during the early years of the transition.  More specifically, in each year
from 2008 through 2017 an additional $50 billion (at 2001 prices) is transferred into the
individual Personal Retirement Accounts as a proportional supplement to the transfer of payroll
taxes.  In 2010 for example, this $50 billion of real transfer is approximately equivalent to an
additional 1 percent of payroll or about 0.4 percent of GDP.  With more funds going into the
PRA accounts, it is possible to reduce the pay-as-you-go benefits more rapidly and still maintain
the combined benefits that are as large or larger than they were in the first general revenue
option.  This is seen by comparing column 4 with column 1.  The smaller pay-as-you-go benefits
and the larger PRA balances independently work to keep the Trust Fund larger than it would
otherwise be.  The Trust Fund remains positive until 2033,  begins repaying it borrowing in 2043
and returns to a positive level in 2053.  As column 6 of Table 4 shows, the Trust Fund borrowing
remains relatively small.
As we noted in the introduction, the decision of whether to use general revenue in this
way or to rely on individual out-of-pocket contributions involves value judgements about who
should bear the costs and benefits of the transition to a mixed system and on the ability of the41In the current Social Security system there is already a transfer of general revenue equal
to the income tax collected on the benefits of high income retirees.  That general revenue transfer
is continued in all of the plans analyzed in the current paper. 
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political process to make the reduction of pay-as-you-go benefits for all future retirees an agreed
starting place for reform. 
3. Alternative Plans without General Revenue Transfers
The plans examined in sections 1 and 2 all involved some use of general revenue.  In
section 2, this was an explicit transfer of projected on-budget surpluses to the personal retirement
accounts.  In both sections, the plans involved a transfer of general revenue equal to one percent
of the PRA assets to the Trust Fund. Although we have explained in section 1 why we believe
that the general revenue transfer of 1 percent of PRA assets is a conservative estimate of the extra
revenue that would result from the additional national saving, we are aware that not everyone
shares our view about the appropriateness of this transfer.  Similarly, there is no general
agreement about the appropriateness of using general revenue to supplement the PRA
contributions. 
In this section we therefore examine what can be done without general revenue transfers
or with very limited transfers. We summarize three options with no general revenue plus one that
involves a very small amount of general revenue transfer to the PRAs. These are not put forward
as particularly attractive options but as an indication of the implications of precluding general
revenue transfers.
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In each option, 1.5 percent of taxable payroll is transferred from the payroll tax revenue to
the PRAs and is matched by an equal contribution, implying that the PRA saving rate each year
is equal to 3 percent of payroll. 
3.1 No Transfer of Incremental Tax Revenue:  Full Benchmark Benefits
Eliminating the transfer to the Trust Fund of the estimated  incremental tax revenue equal
to one percent of the PRA balances would leave Social Security insolvent for the 75-year forecast
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the payroll tax inflow and reducing the pay-as-you-go benefits according to the formula described
in section 1 causes the Trust Fund to become negative and the negative balance to get larger and
larger.  The basic plan is too generous to be financed without some general revenue.
One way to avoid insolvency is to reduce the pay-as-you-go benefits, particularly in the
more distant future when the projected PRA annuities are very large relative to the benchmark
level of benefits.  We examine therefore the limiting case in which the pay-as-you-go benefits are
reduced at a rate that just balances the growth of the projected PRA annuities. This implies that if
the real rate of return in the PRA accounts turns out to be the projected 5.5 percent, the combined
benefits will just equal the benchmark benefits for each future cohort of retirees.  If the real rate
of return in the PRA accounts exceeds the projected 5.5 percent, the combined benefits will be
greater than the benchmark benefits while the opposite is true if the rate of return is less than 5.5
percent.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the benchmark level of pay-as-you-go benefits (in dollars of
2001) for retirees who reach normal retirement age in different years.  Column 2 shows the level
of PRA annuities for those who reach normal retirement age in those years.  The difference
between those two columns is the reduction in the pay-as-you-go benefit that would be specified
in the reform legislation.
With benefits limited in this way and with no transfer of general revenue to the Trust
Fund, the trust fund becomes negative in 2030 and must borrow in order to keep financing the
required level of pay-as-you-go benefits. By 2064, the reductions in the pay-as-you-go benefits
are large enough that the payroll tax receipts exceed the sum of the pay-as-you-go benefits and
the interest on the Trust Fund’s debt.  At that point, the Trust Fund begins to repay its liabilities.
Column 3 shows the Trust Fund assets or liabilities as a percentage of taxable payroll for
the same selected years.  Even at the end of the 75 years, the Trust Fund is still in deficit.  The
deficit is however shrinking rapidly and at an accelerating rate.  Although our model cannot
project beyond 2075 because of the limits imposed by the Social Security data on which we base
our calculations, extrapolation suggests that the system could get back to full solvency by about
2090 or before.42We emphasize that the level of pay-as-you-go benefits for each future year is  “set in
advance” and does not depend on the actual level of PRA annuities.  It would of course be
possible to set the pay-as-you-go benefits to fill the gap that exists ex post between the PRA
annuities and the benchmark benefits as we did in Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick,
“Allocating Payroll Tax Revenue to Personal Retirement Accounts to Maintain Social Security
Benefits and the Payroll Tax Rate,” Tax Notes, June 19, 2000, pp. 1645-1652. That would
provide a government guarantee that individual combined benefits could not be less than they are
under current law.  We return to the issue of risk and guarantees in section 4 below. 
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Although this does combine the benchmark level of benefits and the eventual long-run
solvency of the system, it does so by making the combined benefits in the long-run depend
overwhelmingly on the PRA annuities with only a small role for the pay-as-you-go benefits. In
2050, for example, the PRA annuities are projected to be $10,420 or 61 percent of the current
law benchmark benefits of $17,130.  The pay-as-you-go benefits for that year would be set  in
advance at the difference between these two amounts, $6,710 or only 39 percent of the
benchmark.
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3.2 No Transfer of Incremental Tax Revenue: 97.25 percent of Full Benchmark Benefits
A small adjustment in the level of the combined benefits can avoid the 75-year insolvency
of the Social Security system.  Reducing the pay-as-you-go benefits of all cohorts that retire in
2004 and beyond by enough to cut the combined benefits by 2.75 percent of the benchmark level
makes the system solvent within the 75 years.  This reduction means that the projected value of
the combined benefits is 97.25 percent of the full benchmark benefits.
With this small reduction in projected benefits, the Trust Fund must borrow to pay the
pay-as-you-go benefits  in the years 2032 through 2055 but then begins to repay its borrowing.
The Trust Fund returns to a positive balance in 2075 and the payroll tax receipts then exceed the
pay-as-you-go benefits, implying that the Trust Fund will continue to rise after that date.
The reduction of 2.75 percent is the smallest reduction consistent with bringing the Trust
Fund back to a positive balance by 2075.  A larger reduction would of course bring about balance
at an earlier date.28 ssreform.11042001.wpd
3.3     No Transfer of Incremental Tax Revenue:  Full Benchmark Benefits and Payroll
Tax Surcharge
An alternative to reducing benefits is to add a small surcharge to the payroll tax.  An
increase of just 0.30 percentage points for the 75 years, raising the overall OASDI rate from 12.4
percent to 12.70 percent, would achieve 75-year solvency (defined, as above, as a positive and
growing Trust Fund in 2075) while making the projected value of the combined benefits equal to
the benchmark level in current law.
With this small infusion of extra revenue, the Trust Fund must begin borrowing in 2034
but can start repaying in 2055 and would fully repay its borrowing by 2075.  At that point, the
Trust Fund balance would be permanently growing without the 0.30 percent additional payroll
tax revenue.
3.4 A Small Transfer of Incremental Tax Revenue Equal to 0.23 Percent of PRA
Balances
The basic plan examined in section one involved a general revenue transfer equal to one
percent of PRA balances.  While we regard that as a conservative estimate of the additional
revenue that results from the “1.5 percent plus 1.5 percent” basic PRA system, we have estimated
the minimum transfer that permits the combined benefits to equal the benchmark benefits for
each retiree cohort while maintaining 75-year solvency.
The answer is a general revenue transfer of 0.23 percent of PRA balances.  In 2030, PRA
balances are 125 percent of taxable payroll and therefore about 50 percent of GDP. A general
revenue transfer equal to 0.23 percent of these balances would be only one-third of one percent of
taxable payroll and about one-eighth of one percent of GDP.  Even in 2075, when the PRA
balances are 291 percent of taxable payroll, the revenue transfer would be only three-fourths of
one percent of taxable payroll.
With this transfer, the combined benefit can be kept at the benchmark level for each
cohort of retirees.  The Trust Fund becomes negative in 2032 and begins repaying in 2053.  The
borrowing is fully repaid by 2075.43This section draws on analyses presented in John Campbell and Martin Feldstein, Risk
Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001).
44Recall that the pay-as-you-go benefit is reduced from the benchmark level in current law
by 0.3 percent per year for each year that individuals participate between 2003 and 2007, by 0.6
percent per year of participation for the next six years, 0.9 percent for the next five years, 1.2
percent for the next six years, and then 1.5 percent per year up to a cumulative maximum of 40
percent. 
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4.  Risk and Guarantees
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In this section we return to the issue of the risk that is inherent in investment-based
accounts that we discussed in section 1.4  and consider how that risk can be reduced by
guarantees that do not put a potential burden on future taxpayers.  We focus on the basic plan of
section 1 but the same basic logic applies also to the general revenue financed plan of section 2.
The first point to emphasize is that all of the plans described in this paper are for mixed
systems and not for pure investment-based plans.  During the first few decades, the
overwhelming majority of benefits in each year is financed by payroll taxes on a pay-as-you-go
basis and are therefore not exposed to market risk. In the basic plan, it takes nearly 50 years
before the investment-based portion of benefits is as large as the pay-as-you-go portion.  Even
after 75 years, the pay-as-you-go benefits provide  60 percent of the benchmark level of benefits
and more than 40 percent of the combined benefits from the two sources.
Someone who is 40 years old in 2003 would reach normal retirement age in 2030.  For
such an individual, the reduced pay-as-you-go benefits would still be 75 percent of the
benchmark level projected in current law.  The investment risk only affects the remaining portion
of the benchmark benefit.  If the entire PRA account were totally lost – an investment outcome
that is hard to imagine – the individual would still receive 75 percent of the benefits projected in
current law. 
Because of the growth of real wages, the real level of benefits of future retirees will
continue to grow despite the reductions in the pay-as-you-go benefit implied by the formula
described in section 1.
44  The average retiree reaching normal retirement age in 2003 is projected
to receive annual benefits of $10,170 (in 2001 dollars).  Because each individual’s benefits are30 ssreform.11042001.wpd
indexed to the Consumer Price Index after retirement, they retain their real value throughout the
individual’s retirement. The average benchmark benefit per retiree is projected to grow over time
with each new cohort of retirees as real wages rise.  But even with the reduction, the actual pay-
as-you-go benefit would rise from $10,170 in 2003 to $10,880 in 2030 (in 2001 dollars).  It
would temporarily decline after that but only to a low of $9,250 in 2041 (a decrease of 9 percent
from the initial level) and would then begin rising again. By 2060 the average new retiree would
receive pay as you go benefits of $11,730 and by 2075 it would be $13,120 (a real increase of 29
percent.)   These figures on the real “reduced” pay-as-you-go benefit are shown in column 1 of
table 6.
These pay-as-you-go benefits are what the individual would receive in the totally
improbable case in which the PRA investments became completely valueless.  With the 5.5
percent real return that we used in the calculations of section 1, the combined benefits would be
the amounts shown in column 2 of table 6 in dollars of 2001 and in column 3 as a percent of the
benchmark benefit.  The combined benefits rise from $10,170 in 2003 (when no PRA benefits
are paid) to $14,480 in 2030, $20,700 in 2050 and $29,480 in 2075, a 35 percent increase over
the benchmark benefit.
Any calculation that assumes that all of the investment in personal retirement accounts is
lost (column 1) is obviously absurdly pessimistic. We regard the 5.5 percent real return as a
conservative estimate of what is likely to happen.  The actual returns could be higher or lower. 
In the remainder of this section, we look at the implications of the uncertainty about the rate of
return and how the risk might be reduced.
4.1  Implications of past volatility
 Past experience with the volatility of stock and bond returns provides a basis for
assessing the potential risk of a mixed system.  In the next 20 years, the mixed system is almost
all still pay-as-you-go with the reduced pay-as-you-go benefits equal to  more than 85 percent of
benchmark level for each new cohort of retirees. For those retirees, the investment risk is clearly
very small.  To focus on the maximum risk case, consider what happens after 2040 when the
mixed system is fully phased in and the pay-as-you-go portion is reduced to 60 percent of the45Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, “Individual Risk in an Investment-Based Social
Security System,” American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (September 2001), pp 1116-1125,
available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8074 at
www.nber.org/papers/W8074.  
46The figures in Table 1 of Feldstein and Ranguelova show the probability distribution of
the annuity level that would result from a PRA saving rate of 6 percent of taxable payroll with no
additional pay-as-you-go benefits. That distribution indicates that there is an 80 percent
probability that the PRA annuity at age 77 would exceed 84 percent of the benchmark benefit. 
Dividing the 6 percent PRA saving rate in half implies that, with  a PRA saving rate of 3 percent
of taxable payroll, there is an 80 percent probability that the PRA annuity at age 77 would exceed
42 percent of the benchmark benefit. The Feldstein-Ranguelova analysis made no provision for
bequests.  Allowing for preretirement bequests of the accumulated PRA assets and for a 10-year
certain life annuity at normal retirement age reduces the PRA annuity by 19 percent. This implies
that the 42 percent of benchmark benefits is reduced to 34 percent of the benchmark benefit. 
This is for a system with no pay-as-you-go benefit.  With a pay-as-you-go benefit equal to 60
percent of the benchmark benefit, the combined level is 94 percent of the benchmark.  Since the
Feldstein-Ranguelova calculations also use part of the PRA fund to finance disability benefits,
the implication is that there is an 80 percent probability that the combination of the pay-as-you-
go benefit and the PRA annuity would be substantially greater than 100 percent of the benchmark
OASI benefit.  For further details, see also the Appendix to the current paper.     
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benchmark benefits.  Before that, the pay-as-you-go benefits are relatively larger and the risk is
correspondingly less.
Calculations by Feldstein and Ranguelova
45 imply that there is less than one chance in
five that the combined annuity payable at age 77, i.e., the sum of the pay-as-you-go benefit and
the PRA annuity, would be less than 100 percent of the benchmark benefit.
46  Equivalently, the
odds are more than four to one that the combined benefit will actually exceed the benchmark
benefit projected in current law.  Similarly, the analysis implies that there is less than one chance
in ten that the combined benefits would be less than 83 percent of the benchmark and less than
one chance in 100 that they would be less than 69 percent of the benchmark benefit.
4.2  Alternative Rates of Return
An alternative way of assessing the extent of risk in the mixed system is to calculate the
combined benefit that would result if the individual received substantially less than the 5.5
percent real rate of return each year on PRA balances.  Column 4 of Table 5 shows the combined47TIPS are bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury that adjust the interest payment and the
principal for changes in the level of the consumer price index during the life of the bond.  An
individual who invests now in a 20 year Treasury Inflation Protected Security is guaranteed by
the federal government to get a real return of 3.5 percent.
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benefit (i.e., the pay-as-you-go benefit plus the PRA annuity) under the basic plan that would
result if the real rate of return were only 3.5 percent instead of the 5.5 percent used in our other
calculations. Such a low rate of return is an extremely conservative assumption for a portfolio
46that consists of  60 percent stocks and 40 percent corporate bonds. A 3.5 percent real return
over a lifetime of investing corresponds to approximately the 14
th percentile in the distribution of
rates of return, i.e., based on the experience in the 50 years from 1946 to 1995 the odds are six to
one that the actual return would exceed 3.5 percent. A 3.5 percent real rate of return is also the
rate of return that is available on the riskless Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)
issued by the U.S. government.
47 
With a 3.5 percent real rate of return on the PRA assets, someone who reaches normal
retirement age in 2022 (i.e., today’s 45 year old) would receive combined benefits equal to 96
percent of the benchmark level of benefits.  Even when the real value of the reduced pay-as-you-
go benefit reaches its lowest level (in 2041), the new retiree (today’s 27-year old) would receive
83 percent of the benchmark benefit. The real value of the combined benefit ($12,820) would
then be 30 percent higher than the real value of the average benefit now.  After that the shortfall
from the full benchmark benefit declines; in 2060, for example, the very low 3.5 percent real rate
of return produces a combined benefit equal to 92 percent of the benchmark level.  These figures
are shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6.  The Trust Fund remains solvent in this case but must
borrow from 2036 to 2051. It then begins repaying and returns to a positive value in 2074 and is
both positive and growing in 2075.
The uncertain distribution of rates of return is symmetric, i.e., the return is as likely to be
two percent higher than the 5.5 percent rate of return as it is to be one percent lower.  To indicate
this upside potential, we show in column 6 of Table 6 the combined benefits (relative to the
benchmark) with a real return of 7.5 percent. During the first 20 years of the new program, there33 ssreform.11042001.wpd
would be little difference between the combined benefits with the 5.5 percent real return and the
7.5 percent real return.  After that, the combined benefit based on the 7.5 percent rate of return
would rise rapidly, reaching 140 percent of the benchmark level in 2040, 187 percent in 2050,
and more than 200 percent by the late 2050s. 
As we noted above, a portfolio of 60 percent stocks and 40 percent bonds produced a real
mean return of 6.9 percent during the period 1946 through 1995. We converted this into our
assumed mean return of 5.5 percent by subtracting 0.4 percent for administrative costs and an
additional one percent as a margin of safety.  Alternative mixtures of stocks and bonds would
produce higher and lower rates of return after similar adjustments.
A 6.5 percent rate of return (see column 7 of Table 6) produces combined benefits that
are better in every year than the 5.5 percent case but the difference only becomes substantial after
about 30 years.  With the 6.5 percent return, the Trust Fund is always positive and is rising
substantially at the end of the 75 year forecast period.
The results for the 5.0 percent rate of return (shown in column 8 of Table 6) show that
some cohorts would receive less than the benchmark level of benefits but the difference would be
very small.  The group with the largest reduction are those who reach normal retirement age in
2040.  Their projected combined benefits are 97.4 percent of the benchmark level. The Trust
Fund would be solvent; it would have a negative value between 2039 and 2050 but would then
be positive and rising.  
We have also examined the effect of ignoring the incremental revenue and making no
transfer to the Trust Fund from general revenue.  Section 3 showed that with a 5.5 percent real
return the system could have 75 year solvency (i.e., would return to a positive and growing Trust
Fund balance within 75 years) by reducing benefits for all future retirees by 2.75 percent to 97.25
percent of the benchmark level or by increasing the payroll tax rate by 0.30 from 12.4 percent to
12.7 percent, or by some combination of parts of both of those changes.  If the real return is only
5 percent, achieving 75 year solvency with no transfer of general revenue to the Trust Fund could
be achieved by reducing benefits for all future retirees by 7 percent (to 93 percent of the48If the individual is 21 in 2003 and the inflation is two percent a year over his working
life, the Real Principal Guarantee at age 67 would be $163,000 in the dollars of 2049.
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benchmark level) or by raising the payroll tax rate by 0.75 percent (from 12.4 percent to 13.15
percent).  
4.3  Real Principal Guarantees
In section 1.4 we discussed the idea of a government guarantee that the combined benefits
would be at least as large as the benchmark level for each generation.  We noted that the
government might either provide such a guarantee or sell it to those who were willing to pay for
the protection. 
A simple alternative form of guarantee that we find attractive is an optional PRA “real
principal guarantee” in which the individual is guaranteed that the value of the PRA account at
normal retirement age would be at least as large as the sum of all the deposits made to that
account.  Stated differently, the individual would be guaranteed not to lose any of the real value
of the money put into the account.
To take a simple example, consider someone whose real income (in 2001 dollars) rises
from $25,000 at age 21 to $70,000 at age 66 in $1,000 annual increments. With the basic three
percent (“1.5 % plus 1.5%”) plan, such an individual would save $65,500 in his PRA over those
years.  The Real Principal Guarantee would promise that the individual would have at least
$65,500  (in 2001 dollars) in his account at age 67. 
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To make this option available to everyone, the government could require that any
financial institution (mutual fund, insurance company, or bank) that wanted to provide PRA
investment accounts would have to offer the option of such a Real Principal Guarantee.  Each
individual would be free to decide whether or not he or she wanted to choose the guarantee
option.
To provide such a guarantee without exposing itself to any risk, the financial institution
could invest a fraction of the PRA saving in zero coupon Treasury Inflation Protected49The Treasury now only issues TIPS with interest coupons but the financial sector could
easily “strip” these bonds to create zero coupon TIPS as it has for ordinary Treasury bonds. (The
remaining interest payment inflation guarantees could then be combined with corporate bonds to
provide an attractive security that has a substantial but partial inflation protection and the higher
yield associated with corporate risk.) Alternatively, the Federal government could itself issue
zero coupon TIPS as part of its ordinary debt management. 
50In practice, the financial markets might provide a way of “packaging” such TIPS-based
protection to PRA providers.  The net effect however would be the same as if each PRA account
were invested in the appropriate mix of stocks and bonds. 
51The real logarithmic return was 7.0 percent with a standard deviation of 16.6 percent,
implying the real level return of 8.4 percent. 
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Securities.
49 To see how this would work in practice, consider a 40 year old who earns $50,000. 
Under the basic plan, the individual would transfer $750 of his payroll tax to a PRA account and
add an additional $750 out-of-pocket contribution, a total of $1,500.  To guarantee that at least
the same real $1,500 would be there 27 years later when the individual reached age 67, the
financial institution that provides the PRA account would invest enough of the $1,500 in the zero
coupon TIPS to provide a $1,500 real payment after 27 years.  Since long-term TIPS have a real
yield of 3.5 percent (and a very flat yield curve), we can estimate that the required investment in
TIPS would be $1500 (1.035)
-27 = $593.  The financial institution could therefore invest $593 in
TIPS and the remaining $907 in stocks, confident that the value of the TIPS at age 67 would be
$1000 and therefore that the real value of the PRA balance corresponding to the saving at age 40
would be $1500 plus the value to which the $907 invested in stocks had grown.
50
During the half-century from 1946 to 1995, the real return on the Standard and Poors
index averaged 8.4 percent.
51   If we subtract 40 basis points for administrative costs, the equity
return would be 8.0 percent.  With $593 of the $1500 invested in TIPS with a yield of 3.5 percent
and $907 invested in equities with an expected yield of 8.0 percent, the overall expected real rate
of return for such a 40 year old would be 6.2 percent.  The expected accumulation in this mixed
account would therefore be slightly more than $7500 of which the Real Principal of $1500 would
be fully guaranteed.
Younger individuals would have a higher fraction of their PRA deposits invested in
stocks and older individuals would have a lower fraction invested in stocks. For example,52This pattern of gradually shifting the investments from a high percentage in stocks to a
high percentage in the inflation-protected government bonds is consistent with the philosophy of
“life cycle funds” in private defined contribution plans.
53Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, “Accumulated Pension Collars: A Market
Approach to Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform,”  in Tax Policy and
the Economy,2000 (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001). This is also available as NBER Working
Paper 7861 and at www.nber.org/papers/w7861.
54The option is called a “collar” because it places both upper and lower limits on the
amount that the individual would receive. 
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guaranteeing the value at age 67 of a 25 year old’s PRA deposit would require investing only
23.5 percent of the PRA deposit in TIPS, providing an overall stock-bond expected return of 6.9
percent.  For a 55 year old, the TIPS would be 66 percent of the PRA deposit, implying an
overall expected rate of return of 5.0 percent.
52
Since the overall rate of return in the PRA with a Real Principal Guarantee would decline
from about 7 percent to 3.5 percent at age 66, the overall lifetime rate of return (taking into
account the number of years for which funds would be invested) would not be very different
from the 5.5 percent assumed in the our basic calculations, with the exact expected rate of return
for each individual depending on the time path of that individual’s earnings. The expected PRA
benefits with such a guarantee would therefore not be significantly different from the benefits
that we examined without such a guarantee but with a constant 60:40 mixtures of stocks and
bonds.
The Real Principal Guarantee is an attractive option to require financial institutions to
offer because it is easy for PRA participants to understand and easy for the financial institutions
to provide without incurring any risk themselves. Financial institutions might also offer more
complete guarantees in which individuals accept a lower rate of return in exchange for a
guaranteed level of benefits.  One way for individuals to pay for such guarantees would be by
trading some of the potential benefits in excess of the benefits that could be achieved with the
riskless rate of return of 3.5 percent (shown in column 4 of Table 5) for a guarantee that the
benefits or the implied rate of return are not below some floor.  Feldstein and Ranguelova
53
explore such a “collar” option
54 and show conditions under which it would be possible to55 The Feldstein-Ranguelova paper shows that in principal it is possible with traditional
Black-Scholes option values to buy a complete guarantee against getting less than the benchmark
level of benefits by giving up only part of the above-benchmark potential return.  On this idea of
using derivatives to protect the value of pension benefits, see the very useful paper by Zvi Bodie,
“Financial Engineering and Social Security Reform,” in John Campbell and Martin Feldstein,
Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001).
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purchase the benchmark level of benefits in every year by giving up some portion of the potential
return above that level.
55
5.  Lump Sum Benefits 
Our analysis throughout this paper has assumed that individuals receive benefits in the form of a
mandatory variable life annuity.  This guarantees that the PRA portion of the combined benefits
will be spread out over the entire retirement years. By making the annuitization mandatory, the
problem of self-selection is virtually eliminated.  And by using or permitting a variable annuity,
the individual is able to continue to obtain the same expected high real rate of return during
retirement that he earned during the preretirement accumulation years.  
There are of course alternative possibilities for the options that could be offered to
individuals at age 67.  Individuals might be allowed to take the all or part of the accumulated
principal in the Personal Retirement Account as a lump sum, spending it as they want.  Some
might want to buy a retirement home, or invest in a post-retirement business, or use it to finance
education for a grandchild or a gift to children or others.  Because individuals would still have
the pay-as-you-go benefits, even those who choose to spend or give away the entire accumulation
would still have a significant level of retirement benefits (shown in columns 1 of Table 5 for the
basic plan.) 
Alternatively, individuals might be permitted to withdraw principal funds from their
Personal Retirement Account at age 67 as long as the amount that remains is sufficient (with a
5.5 percent real return) to finance combined benefits equal to the benchmark level or to some
fraction like 90 percent of that level.38 ssreform.11042001.wpd
We do not explore these options in detail but only comment on the size of the fund that
would be accumulated at age 67 by the different age cohorts.  With the basic “1.5 plus 1.5" PRA
plan, an average retiree who reaches normal retirement age in the year 2030 (and therefore has
had 27 years of accumulation) would have a projected PRA balance of $42,550 (in 2001 dollars).
For someone who reaches normal retirement age in 2050, and has therefore participated in the
PRA throughout his working life, the accumulated PRA balance would be $136,540 (in 2001
dollars). These reflect real rates of return in the PRA accounts of 5.5 percent.  
6.   Conclusion
This paper examines a variety of alternative mixed Social Security systems that combine
traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefits with investment-based defined contribution Personal
Retirement Accounts (PRAs). The funds going to the Personal Retirement Account come from a
combination of existing payroll tax payments and either voluntary individual out-of-pocket
contributions or transfers from general revenue. 
In the primary options that we examine, the projected level of combined benefits for each
future cohort of retirees equals or exceeds the benefits projected in current law. We discuss the
issue of risk and present estimates of the cost of guarantees and outline ways that guarantees
could be provided at no cost to taxpayers. We analyze the sensitivity of our results to different
rates of return and to different assumptions about the funding sources and the transfers of general
revenue to the Trust Fund and the personal retirement accounts.
In all of the options that we examine, the Social Security Trust Fund remains solvent. 
Even when it is temporarily negative and forced to borrow, the Trust Fund returns to a positive
balance and is increasing faster than payroll at the end of the 75 year period of Social Security
actuarial projections. 
All of the options that we examine have the following features: 
(1) The PRA funds are invested in a portfolio of stock and bond mutual funds.  At normal
retirement age, the accumulated fund is used to purchase a variable annuity invested in
the same mix of stocks and bonds. 
(2) The traditional pay-as-you-go benefits that are financed by the payroll tax are reduced39 ssreform.11042001.wpd
 for retirees in a way that depends on how many years they participate in the PRA system
or are eligible to participate in the system. 
(3) There is no change in benefits for those who are now retired or who will retire in the
near future.
(4) The disability program is kept separate and financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
(5) Personal retirement account (PRA) balances can be bequeathed to anyone if the
individual dies before normal retirement age.
 (6) The PRA annuity that begins at normal retirement age continues for at least 10 years
even if the retiree dies during this period.
(7) The survivor and dependent portion of the OASI program continue in addition to the
bequest and “10 year certain” features.
Table 7 summarizes some of the key features and results of the principal options that we
have considered. We hope that this analysis will be helpful to those who now have the important
responsibility of reforming the Social Security system.
September 200156Recall our discussion in section 1.4 that the guarantee can be extended to individuals
who invest in a portfolio that is different from the “standard one” by compensating them on the
basis of the shortfall that would have occurred if the individual had invested  in the standard
portfolio.  Individuals would thus have the opportunity to be guaranteed to receive the full
benchmark level of benefits by investing in the standard portfolio but would not lose the value of
that guarantee if they chose a different portfolio.       
57Our procedure also reflects the fact that the future mean return is itself uncertain. The
uncertainty of future returns thus reflects the mean uncertainty as well as the annual volatility.
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Appendix
The Cost of a Benefit Guarantee
This appendix presents a simple calculation of the expected cost to future taxpayers of
providing a guarantee that the combined benefits in the Basic Plan of section 1 will exceed the
benchmark level of benefits projected in current law.  The cost of such a guarantee depends on
the level of pay-as-you-go benefits and on the riskiness of the personal retirement account
annuity.  
During the early decades, while the new mixed system is being phased in, the pay-as-you-
go benefits are a larger fraction of the benchmark benefits than they will be when the pay-as-you-
go benefits have been reduced to the feasible long-run share of the benchmark level. In this
appendix, we focus on the long-run when the pay-as-you-go benefits are reduced to 60 percent of
the benchmark level.
The riskiness of the personal retirement account portion depends on the composition of
the investment.
56  We assume that the individual invests in a portfolio of 60 percent stocks
(represented by the mean and standard deviation of the return on the Standard and Poors index
from 1946 to 1995)  and on the mean and standard deviation of  a corporate bond index.
57 We
assume further that the same investment is the basis for a variable annuity that is purchased when
the individual reaches normal retirement age.  The uncertainty of the annuity payments increases
as the individual ages since the funds are invested for a longer period of time. We focus on the
potential experience of 77 year old retirees as representative of an average or somewhat older
than average retiree. 58Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, “Individual Risk in an Investment-Based Social
Security System,” American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (September 2001), pp 1116-1125,
available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8074 at
www.nber.org/papers/W8074.  
59The Feldstein-Ranguelova calculations did not provide separately for disability benefits.
Since the current analysis continues to fund the disability benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, the
PRA funds available for the OASI benefits would be substantially greater than this distribution
implies. This implies that the current analysis overstate the cost of providing the guarantee. 
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The calculations by Feldstein and Ranguelova
58 provide a cumulative probability
distribution of variable annuity payments as a fraction of the benchmark social security benefits
for a 77 year old retiree who has saved six percent of his payroll earnings during his working life
and retired at age 67. The Feldstein-Ranguelova calculations do not provide any adjustment for
bequests.  The relevant part of the probability distribution shown in those papers is:
Cumulative Probability Annuity as Fraction of Benchmark
with 6% saving
0.01 0.21
0.02 0.26
0.05 0.39
0.10 0.56
0.20 0.84
0.30 1.16
With a three percent saving rate, the annuity at each probability level would be half of these
levels.  The payment of bequests and the 10-year certain annuity feature assumed in the basic
plan reduces the remaining amount by an additional 19 percent.  The cumulative probability
distribution of the available annuity is therefore:
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Cumulative Probability Annuity as Fraction of Benchmark
with 3% saving and bequests
0.01 0.085
0.02 0.105
0.05 0.158
0.10 0.227
0.20 0.340
0.30 0.470
The Feldstein-Ranguelova calculations on which this distribution is based did not provide
separately for disability benefits. Since the current analysis continues to fund the disability
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, the PRA funds available for the OASI benefits would be
substantially greater than this distribution implies. This implies that the current analysis overstate
the cost of providing the guarantee. 
These probabilities imply that with a fully phased in mixed system in which the pay-as-
you-go benefits provide 60 percent of the benchmark benefits, the probability distribution of the
combined benefits associated with a three percent saving rate and the corresponding distribution
of guarantee payments would be:
Cumulative Probability Combined Annuity as          Guarantee Payments as
Fraction of Benchmark         Fraction of Benchmark
0.01 0.685 0.315
0.02 0.705 0.295
0.05 0.758 0.242
0.10 0.827 0.173
0.20 0.940 0.060
0.30 1.070 Zero
The remainder of the probability distribution is associated with combined benefits that
exceed the benchmark and therefore that do not require any guarantee payment.  To be
conservative, we calculate the expected guarantee payment by using the midpoint of each interval
except the first and last, a technique that overstates the true expected payment. We also estimate60A similar calculation implies that the cost for a 67-year old would be 1.94 percent of the
benchmark level of benefits.
61Note that this is the expected value of the cost, i.e., the average value over a large
number of years.  It does not include any extra cost for bearing risk.  As noted above, however,
the government spreads this risk over a large number of taxpayers and, by borrowing, can spread
it over future taxpayers as well as those who are alive at the time that the funds are needed.
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the guarantee payment associated with the first percentile by assuming that there is a probability
of 0.005 of a full guarantee payment of 0.40 of benchmark (implying that the PRA annuity is
worthless) and a probability of 0.005 of a guarantee payment that is half-way between this 0.40
percent of benchmark and the 0.315 percent of benchmark at the 0.01 percent cumulative
probability level. For the interval between a cumulative probability of 0.20 and 0.30, we estimate
that the combined annuity is equal to the benchmark at a cumulative probability of 0.25; we then
estimate the payment in the interval between 0.20 and 0.25 as the midpoint between 0.06 and
zero.
Proceeding in this way, we have the following probabilities and guarantee payments
expressed as a fraction of the benchmark level of benefits:
Probability Guarantee Payment
0.005 0.400
0.005 0.358
0.01 0.305
0.03 0.268
0.05 0.208
0.10 0.116
0.05 0.030
The expected guarantee payment is the sum of the products of the probability and the guarantee
payment, implying an expected guarantee payment of 3.84 percent bo benchmark.
60, 
6162See footnote 7 of the text.  As explained there, this 15.9 percent is net of the estimated
personal income recapture of social security benefits.
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Using the Social Security actuaries’ estimates that the net cost of the full benchmark
benefit would be 15.9 percent of payroll
62 implies that an expected guarantee payment equal to
3.84 percent of the benchmark benefit corresponds to 0.61 percent of payroll.  We stress again
that this is in the long-run when the pay-as-you-go benefits are reduced to only 60 percent of the
benchmark.  The cost of the guarantee would be less before the pay-as-you-go benefits reach this
level.4
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